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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Larry R. VonWald
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 940731-CA

Kevin Plumb,
Defendant and Appellee.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff-appellant

[VonWald] herewith makes and

files his petition for rehearing pursuant to Rule 35,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as to the memorandum
decision of the Court dated and filed May 25, 1995, as
follows:
Points of law or fact the Court overlooked or
misapprehended:
Without referencing the particular language and
without subjecting that language to appropriate analysis,
the

Court

of

Appeals

in

its

memorandum

decision

,f

conclude[s] that jjfc [paragraph 7 of the parties' Earnest

Money Sales Agreement] creates a condition precedent
which failed due to Plumb's inability to gain county
1

approval of his plans."
The Court/s conclusion violates the "plain and
ordinary meaning" rule of interpretation of contract
terms [Equitable Life and Gas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d
1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1993)] when taken with the explicit
and operative terms of the part of paragraph 7 upon which
the Court and defendant relies to establish a condition
precedent; i.e., Buyer to pay for topographic study for
property and obtaining approval of building plans by Salt
Lake County with 30 days of seller providing evidence of
clear

and marketable

title

immediately

followed by

[c]losing shall be within 30 days of seller providing
buyer evidence of satisfaction of liens and providing
clear and marketable title.
Of course it is necessary that appellee Plumb pay,
or that he agrees to pay, the expenses for topographic
studies and for building plans because these are lienable
by those engineers or architects providing those services
and this is all that paragraph 7 of the contract requires
according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms
employed by the parties, i.e., that Plumb "pay for a
topographic study and [for] county approval of building
2

plans within thirty days of seller providing evidence of
clear and marketable title."

A contract is read in

accordance with its express terms and the plain meaning
thereof. C. Sanchez and Son, Inc. v. U.S., 6 F.3rd 1539
(Fed. Cir 1993).
The Court,s interpretation of the provision in
question establishing the obtaining of county approval of
building plans as a "condition precedent" to appellee
Plumb's liability should therefore, in the absence of
additional language which clearly shows obtaining county
approval of building plans is a "condition precedent", be
reheard and vacated. The subject contractual provisions
are

not

ambiguous

precedent.

and

do

not

create

a

condition

"As a general rule conditions precedent are

not favored and the courts are not inclined to construe
a contractual provision as a condition precedent unless
such construction is plainly and unambiguously required
by the language of the contract.

See Minthorne v.

Seeburg Corp., 397 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1968), cert, denied
397 U.S. 1036, 90 S.Ct. 1357, 25 L.Ed.2d 647 (1970);
Restatement of Contracts Sec. 261 (1932); Watson Const.
Co. v. Reppel Steel & Supply, 598 P.2d 116 (Ariz.App.
3

1985).
The Court's

further

conclusion

as to

"Plumb's

inability to gain county approval of his plans11 is
without evidentiary

support and a genuine

issue of

material fact, precluding summary judgment, existed as to
whether

Plumb

acted

reasonably

in

not

submitting

"building plans" which the contract requires, for county
approval to the appropriate county agency even if a
condition precedent is found.
Here, only a drawing, labelled "site plan," [not a
building plan] was submitted to a county functionary who,
by reference to county regulations, rejected the driveway
which was indicated on the drawing submitted by Plumb
because of gradation stages claimed to be out of line
with regulations.

The contract provision is as to

"county approval of building plans" which were never
submitted; had they been, approval might have been
forthcoming from the appropriate county agency, even with
the

indicated

driveway

gradation

which

showed

an

insubstantial variation from those prescribed by county
regulation. "A genuine issue of material fact precluding
summary

judgment arises when the nonmovant presents
4
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When this matter was decided on motion for summary
judgment, the nonmovant's version of the underlying facts
must be believed, and judgment can not be sustained in
favor of the movant unless there is no version of the
facts that could support a contract interpretation in
favor of nonmovant. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250,
106 S.Ct. at 2511.

There is only one meaning that is

reasonably consistent with the contract language; i.e.,
that ascribed above, to-wit, within 30 days of VonWald
providing evidence of clear and marketable title, Plumb
is to pay for a topographic study and for county approval
of building plans.
The well-settled rule of contract interpretation is
that conditions are disfavored and will not be found in
the

absence

of unambiguous

language

indicating

intention to create a conditional obligation.

the

In re

Bubble Up Delaware, Inc., 684 F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir.
1982); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Heller, 65 F.R.D.
(S.D.N.Y.1974);

see

Prager's,

Inc., v.

83, 93

Bullitt, 1

Wash.App. 575, 463 P.2d 217, 222 (1969); 3A A. Corbin,
Corbin on Contracts Sec. 635 (1960); 5 S. Williston, A
Treatise on the Law of Contracts Sec. 665 (W. Jaeger 3d
6

ed. 1961).
It would not have been difficult for Plumb to have
inserted appropriate language. A provision that county
approval of Plumb,s site plan would be necessary or
required might signal such a contingency, as might the
inclusion

of

a formal

mechanism

for obtaining the

approval. Instead, paragraph 7 indicates that "Buyer to
pay for topographic study for property and obtaining
approval of building plans by Salt Lake County with 30
days of seller providing evidence of clear and marketable
title" and "closing . . . within 30 days of seller
providing buyer evidence of satisfaction of liens and
providing clear and marketable title" [paragraph 7(B) and
8] whether county approval of building plans had been
obtained or not.
This Court, and the trial court, under the facts and
the law, erred in regard to their construction and
application of paragraph 7 of the Earnest Money Sale
Agreement.
WHEREFORE, appellant VonWald prays that rehearing be
granted after which the Memorandum Decision of May 25,
1995, be ordered vacated and set aside. The undersigned
7

certifies that this petition is presented in good faith
and not for delay.
DATED June 8, 1995.

LARRY L/WHYTE
On June 8, 1995, two copies of the foregoing
PETITION FOR REHEARING mailed as follows:
Dennis K. Poole
Andrea Nuffer
Dennis K. Poole & Associates
4543 South 700 East, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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